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Abstract
Recently, the problem of allocating one resource per agent with initial endowments (house markets) has seen a renewed
interest: indeed, while in the domain of strict preferences the Top Trading Cycle algorithm (Shapley and Scarf, 1974)
is known to be the only procedure guaranteeing Pareto-optimality, individual rationality, and strategy proofness (Ma,
1994). However, the situation differs in the single-peaked domain. Indeed, Bade (2019) presented the Crawler, an al-
ternative procedure enjoying the same properties, with the additional advantage of being implementable in obviously
dominant strategies. In this paper we further investigate the Crawler and propose the Diver, a variant which checks op-
timally whether an allocation is Pareto-optimal for single-peaked preferences, thus improving over known techniques
used for checking Pareto-optimality in more general domains. We also prove that the Diver is asymptotically optimal in
terms of communication complexity.
1. Introduction
Allocating indivisible resources among a set of agents
is a research agenda that has been extensively studied in
the recent years. It is a particularly dynamic field in both
artificial intelligence (e.g. Brandt et al. (2016)) and eco-
nomics (e.g. Moulin (2018)). It investigates the issue of
fairly and/or efficiently allocating a set of objects to a set
of agents while taking into account their preferences.
In the present paper we focus on the model defined
by Shapley and Scarf (1974), called house market or as-
signment problem, in which there are exactly as many
indivisible resources as agents and where each agent
should receive exactly one resource. In house mar-
kets, Shapley and Scarf (1974) defined the Top Trading Cy-
cle (TTC) procedure which has been extensively studied
(Roth, 1982). When all preferences expressed as strict
linear orders are allowed, the TTC procedure is known
to satisfy Pareto-optimality (it is not possible to improve
some agents’ satisfaction without hurting some others’),
strategy-proofness (no one can benefit from reporting
non truthful preferences) and individual rationality (no
agent receives a house that she likes less than her initial
endowment). It is also provably the only procedure en-
joying such properties (Ma, 1994) when preferences are
strict.
However, preferences frequently exhibit some struc-
tures. The domain of single-peaked preferences, initially
introduced by Black (1948) and Arrow (1951) for voting
scenarios, is one of the most studied preference domains
(Moulin, 1991; Elkind et al., 2017). It states that there
is a common linear order such that all the preferences
are decreasing when moving away from the most pre-
ferred resource following the order. This domain is also
relevant in resource allocation settings (Sprumont, 1991;
Bruner and Lackner, 2015). For instance, agents may be
looking for houses in a street which has a metro station at
one of its ends, and a bike rental platformat the other end;
the agents’ preferences are then likely to be single-peaked
depending on the distance to their favourite means of
transportation. However, until recently, only a few pa-
pers had studied this domain restriction in house mar-
kets. Damamme et al. (2015) investigated (distributed)
swap dynamics in such settings. Motivated by the alloca-
tion of time-slots, Hougaard et al. (2014) and Aziz et al.
(2017) studied deterministic and probabilistic solutions
for the problem of assigning objects to a line, the domain
being more restrictive than single-peaked preferences in
that case.
Recently, Bade (2019) presented the Crawler procedure
for the assignment problem with single-peaked prefer-
ences. This procedure differs from TTC and also satis-
fies Pareto-optimality, strategy-proofness and individual
rationality. As a matter of fact, it is also implementable
using obviously dominant strategies (Li, 2017) when TTC
cannot, thus demonstrating the benefit of considering the
Crawler in the single-peaked domain restriction.
In this note we define a Crawler-based procedure for
checking Pareto-optimality of a given allocation in the
single-peaked domain, more efficiently. We first provide
a brief description of the Crawler (Section 3), and we
analyze its complexity. We then introduce a variant of
this procedure, which we call the Diver that can be used
to check Pareto-optimality of a given allocation in linear
time (Section 4). This improves over known results which
resort on cycle detection techniques and thus run inO(n2)
(Abraham et al., 2005). The procedure also turns out to be
optimal in terms of time and communication complexity.
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2. Preliminaries
We consider a set of agents N = {a1, . . . , an} and a set
of resources R = {r1, . . . , rn} of the same size. An allo-
cation pi = 〈pia1 , . . . , pian〉 is a vector of R
n whose compo-
nents piai ∈ R represent the single resource allocated to
agent ai ∈ N .
Agents are assumed to express their preferences over
the resources through complete linear orders. Agent ai’s
preferences are denoted by ≻i , where r1 ≻i r2 means
that r1 is strictly preferred over r2. A preference profile
L = 〈≻i〉ai∈N is then a tuple of all the agents’ preferences.
For a given linear order≻, we use top(≻) to denote the
top-ranked resource. Similarly, snd(≻) refers to the sec-
ond most preferred resource in ≻. With a slight abuse
of notation we will write top(ai) and snd(ai) to refer to
top(≻i) and snd(≻i). When it is not clear from the con-
text we will subscript these notations to specify the re-
source set considered. For instance topR(ai) is the most
preferred resource for agent ai among the resources in
R ⊆ R.
An instance of a resource allocation problem is then a
tuple I = 〈N ,R, L, pi0〉 composed of a set of agents N ,
a set of resources R, a preference profile L and an initial
allocation pi0.
In some settings, natural properties of the agents’ pref-
erences can be identified, thus restricting the set of pos-
sible preference orderings. The notion of preference do-
main formalizes these restrictions. For a set of resources
R, we denote by LR the set of all linear orders over R.
Any subset D ⊆ LR is then called a preference domain.
We say that an instance I = 〈N ,R, L, pi0〉 is defined
over a preference domain D if the preferences of the
agents belong to D.
In this note, we consider the single-peaked domain. In
this setting, the agents are assumed to share a common
axis ⊳ over the resources and with respect to which their
preferences are defined.
Definition 1. LetR be a set of resources and ⊳ a linear order
(i.e. the axis) over R. We say that a linear order ≻ is single-
peaked with respect to ⊳ if we have:
∀(r1, r2) ∈ R
2 s.t.
r2 ⊳ r1 ⊳ top(≻),
or, top(≻)⊳ r1 ⊳ r2
}
⇒ r1 ≻ r2.
In other words, ≻ is single-peaked over ⊳ if ≻ is de-
creasing on both left and right sides of top(≻), where left
and right are defined by ⊳.
For a given linear order⊳, we call SP⊳ the set of all the
linear orders single-peaked with respect to ⊳:
SP⊳ = {≻ ∈ LR | ≻ is single-peaked w.r.t. ⊳}.
A preference domain D is called single-peaked if and
only if D ⊆ SP⊳ for a given ⊳. An instance I is said
to be single-peaked if it is defined over a single-peaked
preference domain.
Pareto optimality of the outcome guarantees that no
agent can improve her allocation without incurring a loss
on at least another agent, while individual rationality
guarantees agents have incentive to participate.
Definition 2 (Pareto-optimality). Let I = 〈N ,R, L, pi0〉 be
an instance. An allocation pi is said to be Pareto-optimal if there
is no other allocation pi′ such that for every agent ai ∈ N either
pi′ai ≻ piai or pi
′
ai
= piai and there exists at least one agent
aj ∈ N such that pi′aj ≻ piaj .
If such allocation pi′ exists, we say that pi′ Pareto-dominates
the allocation pi.
Definition 3 (Individual rationality). For a given instance
I = 〈N ,R, L, pi0〉, an allocation pi is individually rational if
for every agent ai ∈ N we have either piai ≻ pi
0
ai
or piai = pi
0
ai
.
We illustrate these two concepts on a simple example.
Example 1. Let us consider the following instance with 5
agents and 5 resources. The preferences, presented below, are
single-peaked with respect to r1⊳ r2⊳ r3⊳ r4⊳ r5. The initial
allocation pi0 = 〈r5, r1, r3, r4, r2〉 is defined by the underlined
resources.
a1 : r1 ≻1 r2 ≻1 r3 ≻1 r4 ≻1 r5
a2 : r5 ≻2 r4 ≻2 r3 ≻2 r2 ≻2 r1
a3 : r3 ≻3 r2 ≻3 r1 ≻3 r4 ≻3 r5
a4 : r4 ≻4 r3 ≻4 r2 ≻4 r1 ≻4 r5
a5 : r4 ≻5 r5 ≻5 r3 ≻5 r2 ≻5 r1
The allocation pi0 is not Pareto-optimal as it is Pareto-
dominated by the squared allocation pi = 〈r1, r5, r3, r4, r2〉.
Note that the allocation pi′ = 〈r1, r5, r3, r2, r4〉 would make
every agent having at least their third top resource, but would
violate individual rationality for agent a4.
3. The Crawler
In house markets under single-peaked preferences,
Bade (2019) recently introduced the Crawler procedure.
The agents are initially ordered along the single-peaked
axis according to the resource they initially hold. The
first agent is the one holding the resource on the left side
of the axis and the last agent is the one holding the re-
source on the right side of the axis. We denote by R the
list of available resources ordered according to the single-
peaked axis and N the list of available agents such as the
ith agent of the list is the one who holds the ith resource
in R.
The algorithm then screens the agents from left to
right1 and check, for each agent ai, where the peak
topR(ai) of ai is:
1. If topR(ai) is on her right, the algorithmmoves to the
next agent on the right. The agent is said to “pass”.
2. If ai holds her peak topR(ai), then topR(ai) is allo-
cated to ai, ai and topR(ai) are then removed fromN
and R. The algorithm restarts screening the agents
from the left extremity of the axis.
1Note that the algorithm can equivalently be executed from right to
left.
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Algorithm 1: The Crawler procedure
Input: An instance I = 〈N ,R, L, pi0〉 single-peaked
with respect to ⊳
Output: An allocation pi
1 pi ← empty allocation
2 R←R: list of resources sorted accordingly to ⊳
3 N ← N : list of agents such that the ith agent is the
one who initially holds the ith resource in R
4 while N 6= ∅ do
5 t∗ ← |N |
6 for t = 0 to |N | − 1 do
7 if rt ≻t rt+1 then /* no crawl */
8 t∗ ← t
9 Break
10 end
11 end
12 r ← topR(at∗)
13 pick(at∗ , r, N,R, pi)
14 end
15 return pi
3. If topR(ai) is on the left of ai, the agent is allocated
her peak topR(ai). Let t
∗ be the index of topR(ai) and
t the index of ai (we have t
∗ < t). Then, all the agents
between t∗ and t− 1 receive the resource held by the
agent on their right (the resources “crawl” towards
left). ai and topR(ai) are then removed from N and
R. The algorithm restarts screening the agents from
the left extremity of the axis.
The algorithm terminates onceN , and thus R, are empty.
A formal description of the procedure is given in Al-
gorithm 1. Note that we make use of the sub-procedure
pick(at∗ , r, N,R, pi)which simply assigns the resource r to
the given agent at∗ in the allocation pi, and then removes
the agent and the resource from the lists of available
agents and resources,N andR respectively. Since the list
of resources is ordered following the single-peaked axis
and the ith agent inN corresponds to the owner of the ith
resource in R, the removal of r and at∗ is in fact equiva-
lent to assigning r to agent at∗ and crawling the resources
from right to left.
Let us illustrate the execution of the Crawler on the in-
stance of Example 1.
Example 2. Let us return to Example 1. The execution of the
Crawler is depicted in Figure 1. The initial allocation is pre-
sented in the box 1. Initially, agent a3 is the first agent whose
top is not on her right, she thus receives her top r3 (box 2). The
second step matches agent a4 to r4 (box 3). On the third step,
agents a2 and a5 both have their top on the right but the last
agent a1 has her top on her left, she is then matched to her top
r1 (box 4). Agent a5 is matched to r5 on the fourth step (box 5).
Finally a2 is assigned resource r2 (box 6).
As observed by Bade (2019), the Crawler always termi-
nates. It is easy to see that it runs in quadratic time.
Proposition 1. The Crawler procedure terminates and its
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Figure 1: The Crawler procedure run on Example 1. Each dashed box
corresponds to a step and a pair resource agent is boxed if the resource
has been allocated to the agent.
complexity is in O(n2) where n is the number of agents and
objects.
Proof. Termination is proved by observing that |N | is
strictly decreasing at each step of the main while loop.
This loop is applied at most n times and each step of the
loop requires at most O(n) elementary operations. The
time complexity is then in O(n2).
We conclude this section by studying the
communication requirement of the procedure
(Kushilevitz and Nisan, 1996). We are here inter-
ested in the amount of information communicated from
the agents to the center.
Proposition 2. The crawler requires at most n(n + 1)/2 +
n logn bits of communication.
Proof. The crawler runs in n rounds. At each round i, ev-
ery remaining agent is being askedwhether shewishes to
pass (answered using 1 bit) or to designate a resource on
the left she wants to get (answered in at most logn bits).
Overall, for the i-th round, at most n− i agents will pass,
and clearly only one agent designates a resource. Thus
the protocol requires in the worst case
∑n
i=1[(n − i) +
logn] = n(n+ 1)/2 + n logn, which is in O(n2).
Since communicating the full preference lists requires
O(n2 logn), this protocol does save some communication,
even asymptotically, compared to the naive protocol.
4. Optimally checking Pareto-optimaility: the Diver
We now turn to the question of whether we can gain
advantage from the single-peaked domain in order to
check Pareto-optimality more efficiently. Recall that in
the domain allowing any linear order, this can be done
in quadratic time (Abraham et al., 2005).
More formally, given an instance I = 〈N ,R, L, pi0〉
single-peakedwith respect to⊳, we consider the problem
CheckPO whose answer is yes if and only if pi0 is Pareto-
optimal. We assume that⊳ is known by the agents. With-
out loss of generality, we consider that ∀ai ∈ N , pi
0
ai
= ri.
First, observe that the Crawler indeed returns the initial
allocation when it is Pareto-optimal.
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Observation 1. Let pi be an allocation, pi is Pareto-optimal
if and only if the Crawler returns pi when applied to pi as the
initial allocation.
Proof. Any allocation pi returned by the Crawler is Pareto-
optimal (Bade, 2019). Thus, if pi is not Pareto-optimal a
different allocation is returned. On the contrary, if pi is
Pareto-optimal, and since the Crawler is individually ra-
tional, no trading cycle will be performed during the ex-
ecution. The Crawler thus returns pi.
However, this procedure does not enjoy better com-
plexity guarantees than the ones not specific to single-
peaked domains, as its worst-case time complexity is in
O(n2). A worst-case instance can be described as follows:
suppose that all the agents (ordered from left to right),
have the next resource on their right as their top, except
for the last onewho likes her own resource. In that case, at
each step, the Crawlerwould go through all the agents be-
fore realizing that the last one wants to keep her resource.
We propose a variant of the Crawler, called the Diver,
which allows to check Pareto-optimality of the initial al-
location more efficiently. The key difference with the
Crawler is that the Diver procedure does not start a new
screening once an agent picks a resource: it only checks
whether the last agent whowas happy to crawl for this re-
source now agrees to dive to the next one. The Diver thus
proceeds in a single screening of the agents.
At each step, the central entity asks the agent whether
she wishes to:
(1) pick her current resource;
(2) pass (expressing that she is happy to dive to the next
resource); or
(3) pick a smaller resource.
Note that, each time an agent picks a resource, the cen-
tral entity communicates this information to the other re-
maining agents so that they can update their list of avail-
able resources.
In case (1), the agent (and her resource) are removed
and we enter a sub-protocol called backtrack-call in which
the previous agents are asked one by one whether they
still agree to dive to the next resource. This sub-protocol
stops as soon as one agent says yes, or when there are no
more agents left to consider. All the agents who said ’no’
pick their current resources and are themselves removed
together with their resource.
Whenever an agent is happy to dive to the next re-
source, the diver simply moves on to the next agent. This
is case (2).
As soon as an agent says she wants a smaller resource,
the protocol stops and returns ’not PO’. This corresponds
to case (3). Note that in this case, we have the guarantee
that there is indeed a better resource available, otherwise
the agent would have picked her own resource.
If the screening goes through all the agents, then all the
agents left the protocol with their own resource, and the
protocol returns ’PO’.
The protocol is formally described in Algorithm 2. The
sub-procedure pick(ai, r) simply assigns resource r to
Algorithm 2: The Diver procedure
Input: An instance I = 〈N ,R, L, pi0〉 single-peaked
with respect to ⊳
Output: PO if pi0 is Pareto-optimal and not PO
otherwise
1 pi ← list of pairs (ai, ri) such that agent ai holds
resource ri in pi
0, sorted according to ⊳ for the
resources
2 D ← ∅: list of agents who crawl or dive
3 for (ai, ri) in pi do
4 if topR(ai) = ri then /* pick your top */
5 pick(ai, ri)
6 for aj in reverse(D) do
7 if rj ≻aj ri+1 then /* if you don’t
dive, pick your resource */
8 pick(aj , rj , D)
9 else
10 Break
11 end
12 end
13 else if ri ≻ai ri+1 then/* your top is on your
left: not PO */
14 return not PO
15 else /* crawl */
16 D ← D.append(ai)
17 end
18 end
19 return PO
agent ai, while pick(ai, r,D) does the same, and removes
agent ai from the list D of agents who crawl or dive.
Example 3. Coming back to Example 1, by applying the Diver
to the initial allocation pi0, the agents are first sorted as follows:
r1
•
a2
r2
•
a5
r3
•
a3
r4
•
a4
r5
•
a1
The Diver screens the agent from left to right and asks each
agent her wish:
1. a2 passes;
2. a5 passes;
3. a3 picks her current resource, a5 still agrees to pass;
4. a4 picks her current resource, a5 still agrees to pass;
5. a1 wants to pick a smaller resource (r1) → the Diver re-
turns ’not PO’.
Indeed, this allocation is dominated by 〈r1, r2, r3, r4, r5〉.
Now let us consider the allocation pi = 〈r1, r5, r2, r4, r3〉
leading to the following order:
r1
•
a1
r2
•
a3
r3
•
a5
r4
•
a4
r5
•
a2
Again, the Diver screens the agent from left to right and asks
each agent her wish:
4
1. a1 picks her current resource;
2. a3 passes;
3. a5 passes;
4. a4 picks her current resource, a5 still agrees to pass;
5. a2 picks her current resource, a5 picks her current re-
source, a3 picks her current resource. All the agents have
left with their resource and the Diver returns ’PO’.
Next, we prove the correctness of the Diver and show
that it runs in O(n).
Theorem 1. The Diver always terminates, runs in O(n) and
returns whether the initial assignment is Pareto-optimal or not.
Proof. Termination is obvious since the procedure pro-
ceeds in a single main screening of the finite set of re-
sources. We first show that the procedure is sound. First
observe that when the Diver returns ’PO’, all the agents
must have picked their initial resource. Indeed, consider
the last agent in the order: this agent picked her resource
(otherwise the procedure would have returned ’not PO’).
But now the agent on her left must also have picked her
resource (as there is no more possibility to dive), and so
on until there are no agents remaining. Now, following
the argument used in Bade (2019), consider all the agents
who picked their resource during this process, in the or-
der they picked it: they clearly have all picked their best
available resource. The obtained matching is thus indeed
Pareto-optimal. On the other hand, when the Diver re-
turns ’not PO’, there is indeed an improving cycle, con-
sisting of the agent (say, aj) who chose a resource on her
left, and all the agents, from the owner of this resource to
aj , who are not matched yet.
In terms of complexity, sorting the agents according to
the single-peaked order can be done inO(n) using count-
ing sort (Cormen et al., 2009, Section 8.2). Now for the
main loop of the procedure: in the reverse loop, note that
if k + 1 agents are screened backwards, then k agents are
removed for good. Thus through the entire procedure the
reverse loop involves O(n) steps, and thus the main loop
takes O(n) as well, which gives us the linear time com-
plexity.
The same line of analysis allows us to derive a result
regarding the amount of communication induced by the
procedure, as can be done for other social choice mecha-
nisms, see e.g. (Brandt et al., 2016, Chapter 10). The Diver
only requires a linear (in the number of agents) number
of bits to be communicated from the agents.
Proposition 3. The Diver requires 4n bits of communication.
Proof. The key is to observe that sub-protocol backtrack-
call requires overall n + n bits, as there may only be n
agents saying ’no’ and n agents saying ’yes’ throughout
the whole run of the Diver. In the main loop of the proto-
col, the query requires 2 bits to be answered (as there are
three possible answers). This makes overall 2n+2n = 4n
bits, thus, only O(n) bits.
We now show that the Diver is asymptotically optimal,
both in terms of time and communication complexity. In
fact, a simple adversarial argument suffices to show that
any algorithm solving this problem must query at least
n− 1 agents and thus read an input of this size at least.
Proposition 4. In the single-peaked domain, the time complex-
ity of CheckPO is Ω(n).
Proof. Simply take as adversarial input an instance where
every agent receives initially her preferredhouse. Nopro-
cedure can answer CheckPO before querying less than
n − 1 agents. Indeed, as long as two agents remain to be
queried, it could be that they form a trading cycle.
As each query requires at least one bit to be an-
swered, this immediately implies a similar bound on
the communication complexity. This can alternatively
be shown by exhibiting a straightforward fooling set
(Kushilevitz and Nisan, 1996), whichweprovide for com-
pleteness. We consider strict preferences for the agents
written≻Li in a profileL, and by a slight abuse of notation
we write ≻
L|L′
i to say that ≻i is the preference of agent ai
in either L or L′. In our context, the fooling set will be a
collection of profiles F = 〈L1, . . . LK〉 such that:
1. for any i ∈ {1, . . .K} CheckPO’s answer on
〈N ,R, Li, pi0〉 is yes.
2. for any i 6= j, there exists L′ = 〈≻
Li|Lj
1 , · · · ≻
Li|Lj
n 〉,
such that CheckPO’s answer on 〈N ,R, L′, pi0〉 is no.
By a standard result in communication complexity, it is
known that log |F| is a lower bound on the communica-
tion complexity of the problem (Kushilevitz and Nisan,
1996).
Proposition 5. In the single-peaked domain, the communica-
tion complexity of CheckPO is Ω(n).
Proof. Let us call a consensual profile the profile where
≻i=≻j for any (i, j), i.e. all the agents have the same lin-
ear orders over the resources. The consensual linear order
will be denoted by≻. We claim that the set F of the 2n−1
(single-peaked) consensual profiles constitutes a fooling
set.
To show this, first observe that in any such profile, the
original assignment pi0 is Pareto-optimal. Indeed, in a
consensual profile, no trading cycle is possible. Hence the
aforementioned condition 1. of a fooling set is satisfied.
Now to show that we can fool the function, consider
any pair of profiles (Li, Lj). As these profiles are differ-
ent, there must exist at least one pair of resources (rp, rq)
such that rp ≻ rq in Li, while rq ≻ rp in Lj (it is true for
all agents since the profiles are consensual). Now con-
sider the agent ap (resp. aq) holding rp (resp. rq) in pi
0
and a mixed profile L′ such that:
∀k ∈ N ,≻L
′
k =
{
≻Lik if k 6= p,
≻
Lj
k if k = p.
Hence, ap and aq have opposite preferences for rp and
rq and would prefer to swap, i.e. CheckPO’s answer on
〈N ,R, L′, pi0〉 is no. This concludes the proof.
The Diver is thus asymptotically optimal in terms of
time and communication complexity.
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5. Future work
A natural extension of the domain studied is to
allow for indifferences in preferences. In the uni-
versal domain where indifferences can be expressed,
Aziz and De Keijzer (2012) defined a set of Pareto-
optimal procedures generalizing TTC in that setting,
which however include procedures that are not strategy-
proof. Plaxton (2013) and Saban and Sethuraman (2013)
independently proposed general frameworks for efficient
and strategy-proof generalization of the TTC procedure
with indifferences. In her paper, Bade (2019) defines the
“circle crawling” procedure, which enjoys the same prop-
erties as the crawler. It would be interesting to study
whether a variant in the spirit of the Diver could be
adapted in that setting as well.
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